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The explanation of the position of the minister, his place and role wit­
hin the state guidance, particularly the public administration, the survey 
and analysis of the character, tools and methods of the ministerial manage­
ment is obviously an important, not to be neglected element of those exa­
minations which aim the modernisation of the state and political life and 
public administration. In a given case not only those changes deserve 
attention, which have taken place in the position, organisation, tasks, func­
tions and relation mechanism of the minister and ministry during the his­
tory — as they are one of the oldest elements of public administration, but 
Ave ought to survey that question too that the alteration in the life of con­
temporary society and state, especially the technological-sctientific revolu­
tion, the mutual dependence between the countries and national economies 
systems what kind of new solutions indicate and what changes are required 
concerning the public administration and within this the ministerial level 
managment system as such. Beyond the mentioned general aspects the role 
of the minister and ministerial system, the contents and substantial factors 
of management and the survey of ist elements are considered as actual and 
urgent, moreover those reform processes, which aim the significant improve­
ment of the social ans state démocratisation taking place in the socialist 
countries, necessarily involve changes in the role and structure of public 
administration, its means, including the ministerial institutions too. As we 
survey the institution of the minister, we understand that this problem 
consists of several and interrelated factors, namely in the politics, organi­
sation science, economics, sociology, politology and legal sciences. According 
to the nature of the problem we are particularly concerned of the political 
and law aspects of this sphere of problems among all other approaches of 
it, i. e. the changes of the ministerial sphere of competence is surveyed ma­
inly in the framework of the state organisation and the public administ­
ration, however, we strive to recognize the social, political, economic, etc. 
sides of the problem too.
1*
I. The institution of ministry, its general questions and development trends
It is well known that the roots of the ministerial institution go back 
to the age of absolutism, the time of the creation of bourgeois states. Actu­
ally that was the development period, when the outlines of the ministerial 
role, the ministerial independence and management, especially the minis­
terial responsibility were drawn, its characteristic features were established 
and formed. This development trend went along with the appear ance of the 
bourgeois states, when unambiguously were created and constitutionally 
formulated those basic institutions, which were aimed to promote and help 
the position, independence and responsibility of the minister in the state 
system. In the classical period of the bourgeois development the basic solu­
tions concerning the ministerial institution — political and legal regulati­
ons — were created, a significant part of them still prevails, although on 
one hand with the appearance of the socialist countries a different rule and 
practice were applied compared them to the solutions produced by the 
classical bourgeois development, on the other hand the scientific-technolo­
gical revolution, the establishment of the mutual dependence of the states 
require a revaluation of the traditional features of the ministerial institu­
tion.
The evaluation of the position and role sphere of the minister requires 
the survey of closely connected and even mutually necessary factors. Such 
factors are
1. The extent of the ministerial independence and the activity sphere 
of the minister;
2. The ministerial responsibility;
3. The organisational aspects of the ministerial institution.
1. The extent and effectiveness of ministerial independence are depen­
ding on several aspects. Thus the ministerial independence is remarkably 
influenced by the social and political order of the given country, its admi­
nistrative structure, the system of the political setup, the relevant consti­
tutional and other legal regulations, traditions, actual national conditions, 
etc. Followingly the role of the minister as institutions, the extent of the 
ministerial independence may significantly differ from each other even in 
countries of identical system. The development of the extent of ministerial 
independence may significantly depend on that fact too whether the minis­
ter as the head of each ministry is to be considered as a single responsible 
head of the given public administrative branch, who is entitled to all com­
petences given to that ministry, or he is just a leader, who possesses and 
practices only a certain part of the competence of the ministry, albeit the 
most important and fundamental rights belong to this sphere of compe­
tence. As it is well-known, both approach can attract arguments for and 
against.
a) Connected to this subject we refer only as a sign to that fact that 
for the mentioned first view seems to be supported by the argument that 
e. g. in the domestic law regulations the legal rules arranging the sphere
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of activity and competence of each branch (resolutions by the Council of 
Ministers) concern the sphere of activity and competence of the minister, 
not the ministry. The other approach, accepted by us too, starts out of that 
reality, i. e. sociological fact that the activity and competence sphere of the 
minister does not and cannot include the whole activity of the ministry 
as far as the competence sphere and rights, licences of the organisation 
are concerned, because in a certain way — at least from the aspect of orga­
nisational sociology — the minister as the head of the ministerial organi­
sation is a part of it himself. Beside we ought to consider that a certain 
division of labour, therefore a certain division of competence prevails bet­
ween the minister and the ministerial organisation, its units and parts. This 
fact has been formulated by the Hungarian authoritative regulations too, 
as the Act I of 1981 on the rules of public administrative procedure makes 
a general distinction between the minister on one hand, on the other hand 
the ministry as independent competence level.
In that way the development of the ministerial independence is signi­
ficantly influenced by the circumstance that the ministerial function 
is a political, or in narrower meaning public administrative function to a 
certain extent. It is known that in the classical period of the bourgeois 
development the unity of the political and public administrative government 
had prevailed in a powerful way, which nave a foundation for a relatively 
wide sphere of the ministerial independegce. In that stage of development 
the framework and movement sphere of the ministerial independence had 
been determined by the extent of its dependence from the head of state, 
the dependence of the executive power from the head of state and the 
parliament on one hand, the division of labour within the structure of exe­
cutive power, especially the way and nature of the division of labour among 
the government and its ministers. From the end of the 19th century ths 
picture had been altered in a way namely with the appearance of political 
parties the earlier, more or less existing unity of the political and public 
administrative government has suffered a certain rupture and a multiple 
and complex system of relations between the political parties and the state 
has been created. This system heavily influences the institution of the 
ministerial independence, the role of the minister and the activity sphere 
of the ministerial leadership. Followingly it is reasonable to get into some 
details on the development of the relations between the political parties 
and the bourgeois state and its institutions, some aspects of the relation 
in the ministerial independence and activitv sphere and the most important 
between the Party and the socialist state, especially concerning the changes 
momentum which determine the changes and developments of the minis­
terial independence and sphere of role.
The recent multiple and far-reaching relations and mutual effects bet­
ween the capitalist state and the political parties are the results of a long 
historical process. Surveying the system of relations in a simplified way 
two main periods of development can be distinguished:
— the development period preceding the Second World War; the rela­
tion between the political parties and the capitalist state can be characteri-
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zed such way that gradually those forms and methods were emerging which 
made possible that the political parties influence the several different areas 
of state activity. In this period of development this relation as whole can 
be characterized as a functional relation, which succeeded primarly through 
the participation of political parties in the elections.
— The development period after the Second World War; Actually this 
was the period when the institutional framework of the participation of 
political parties in the life of the state has been arranged, namely both the 
constitutions adapted in this period and the special legal regulations have 
contained detailed rules on the political parties. Beyond this fact the activi­
ties of political parties are not curtailed at all to the elections, but their 
influence appears and powerfully expresses itself in the operations of the 
Parliament and the government as well. This influence — at least from a 
political aspect — has quite decisive importance considering the compositi­
on of the government, the directions of its activities and their substantial 
contents. In the relation and aspect examined by us the powerful incursion 
of political parties into the state mechanism means that the prevalence of 
ministerial independence is decisively influenced — in a political sense — 
the adherence to some political party, the program of the given political 
party strongly influences his sphere of activity too. Consequently in this 
period of bourgeois development the presence of political parties and their 
certain decisive role in the state system is such a factor, which should be 
considered while examining the constitutional framework of ministerial 
independence.
Meanwhile we have to indicate that in the contemporary bourgeois 
development not only the influence of the parties on the state life should 
be taken into consideration, but have to count on an adverse process too, 
which operates in the same time. Namely the capitalist state also intervenes 
into the life of the parties, when it ensures a legally regulated institutional 
framework for their operation. At least the state strives to carve out some 
kind of supervising role for itself -  institutionally too. This fact is suppor­
ted by the examination of those legal regulation material — usully on the 
level of acts — which are concerning parties. Even without a more detailed 
analysis of the legal rules involving parties it could be ascertained that the 
capitalist state in not only declaring the rules between the political parties 
and the state, but it intends to determine and regulate some requirements for 
political parties, the system of financial sources of the parties, etc. This 
controversial relation and certain mutual effect between the political par­
ties and the bourgeois state naturally have their impact on the operation 
of the government and on the miniszterial independence and sphere of role 
as well, particularly by that fact that in this complex system of relations 
the frameworks are more or less determined in depth and details concerning 
the operation of political parties or at least this is realized in relation of the 
state structure.
Naturally the relation, the mutual link between the party and the 
state, including the relation between the party and the public administra­
tion appears in the socialist countries too. This relation and mutual effect
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appear in the political system of the socialist order too. The specialty and 
distinctive feature of the relation between the Marxist-Leninist Party and 
the socialist state that in the socialist society the Party fulfills a dominant 
leadership role declared by the constitution too in relation to the whole 
society, therefore to the state organisation as well. This dominant leader­
ship role is necessarily a political one and it is realized by such instruments.
When we survey the political features of ministerial independence 
among socialist conditions, we have to survey primarily the development 
of the relation between the Party and the government (Council of Minis­
ters), all the more because this relation has ultimately decisive importance 
concerning the political framework of the ministerial independence. Howe­
ver the mentioned constitutional declaration of the dominant role of the 
Party does not mean a legally instituted hierarchy between the Party and 
the state and social organs, entities. The leading role of the Party prevails 
through political political channels instead of the usage of law. The activity 
of the Party takes places in the framework of the constitution too. Concerning 
the relations between the Party and the government, including the minister 
it is reasonable to call the attention to the following:
The Council of Ministers as a supreme organ on the peak of the pub­
lic administrative structure possess a distinguished place in the political 
realisation of those decisions which were accepted by the Party, in the 
organisation of carrying out these resolutions. However, according to our 
view this does not mean that the role of Ministerial Council is limited 
exclusively to the role of executive operations. There is a much more comp­
lex and more difficult mutual relation and effect as the political decisions 
are further shaped by the events in the process of implementation, enriche- 
ned with new elements, beside the fact that the acitvity of the Council 
of Ministers — among others the analysis of the implementation experien­
ces — has a feedback to the leading activity of the Party, within certain 
limits influences and shapes it.
Another remarkable momentum is the personal relation between the 
leading organs of the Party and the Council of Ministers. As it is known 
in the course of the socialist development this latter one is realized in vario­
us forms, it is still such a real feature which cannot be and should not be 
ignored. This above-mentioned personal relation is realized in the fact that 
the leading members of the government are in the same time also members 
of the supreme organs of the Party (Cental Committee, Political Committee, 
which actually aims to give further support to the leading role of the Party 
on the personal matters too. One of the important questions of the deve­
lopment of the relation between the top organs of the Party and the go­
vernment is the division an dseparation of the tasks and function between 
them. As the history and its experiences show in the socialist development 
the various periods have produced the most problems just abont this one. 
We do not intend to go in details concerning the specific and different ways 
of solutions of each stage of the socialist development, we only refer to the 
fact that in this aspect it is reasonable to avoid two extremities, on one 
hand such a view that the Party intends to limit its leading role exlusively
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to exert its theoretical influence, on the other hand to take away the bor­
derline netween the Party and the government. Followingly the approp­
riate approach seems to be that the mentioned bodies are working 'parallel 
in the framework of their tasks, responsibilities, aims. This approach requires 
the proper co-operation, furthermore their independent operation con­
cerning the specific nature of their tasks and functions should be ensured.
Concerning the experiences in this field, considering the theoreticaol- 
political views, we have to emphasize the following aspects:
— even today it is an actual task the more powerful separation of the 
competence sphere of the leading organs of the Party and the government;
— we have to strive for the elimination of the still existing parallel 
decision practice and the elimination of the meriing of political responsibi­
lity spheres;
— the government should take part in the preparation of the very 
significant political issues and generally in the formulation of politics 
as well;
— it should be achieved that in the decision-taking the specific approach 
of the decision-maker should prevail much stronger than today. This naturally 
depends on the preparation of decision too, i. e. which aspects of the deci­
sion are stressed by the policy-makers, to what extent the character, task 
and the features, which are due to the place in the political hierarchy are 
taken in consideration concerning the decision forum.
Considering the mentioned and further aspectrs of the relation bet­
ween the Party and the government it could be reasonable to surveywhether 
in the future the Party guidance of the institution of the Minister should 
not be done primarily thourgh direct ways, but thourgh the government 
indirectly.
2. The institution of ministerial independence is closely connected 
with the institution of ministerial responsibility. In the history the institu­
tion of ministerial responsibility took shape in the initial stage of the bour­
geois development. The conditions of the prevalence of this institution 
and the system of its constitutional and legal regulation were constructed 
in the parliamentarian governmental system with a comprehensive cha­
racter. The appearance of the political parties has exerted a powerful influ­
ence on both the development of the ministerial independence sphere and 
the ministerial responsibility, the functioning of this responsibility form is 
connected several ways to the operation of political parties, even in such 
case when the implementation of the ministerial responsibility has consti­
tutional and characteristically law-regulated elements. Although we do 
not intend to analyze the guestions of constitutional and other regulations 
concerning the institution of ministerial responsibility we wish to survey 
some general problems which are regarded important considering the sphere 
of problems surveyed by us.
The ministerial responsibility as a characteristic form of responsi­
bility could be interpreted primarily as a political responsibility. This poli­
tical responsibility means the responsibility of the minister to the Parlia­
ment; in this aspect he is responsible for the whole of his activity. The
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foundation of the implementation of this responsibility is actually a certain 
appropriate answer or behaviour concerning to these expectations in ■poli­
tics and effectiveness. The political responsibility of the minister to the Parli­
ament may appear in two different ways: on one hand in the form of the 
personal responsibility of the minister, on the other hand in the form of 
collective responsibility is realized by the mediation of the responsibility 
of the government to the Parliament.
In the course of development several forms of the implementation of 
the responsibility of the minister to Parliament have taken shape. Without 
the claim of completeness we may refer to the fact that the system of inter­
pellation is obviously such an institution, which may serve as a basis for 
the implementation of the political responsibility of the minister. For ex­
ample if the Parliament does not accept the answer of the minister to a 
question, this can be a reason and it does serve as a reason in some countries 
to the resignation of the minister. An important institution of the political 
responsibility of the minister to the Parliament is the proposal for a vote of 
non-confidence censure. On the base of the jiroposal for censure the withdra­
wal of confidence usually happens when there are objections concerning 
the effectiveness of the ministerial activities from political or other special 
aspects.
The political responsibility of the minister is separated from the legal 
responsibility of the minister. Its characteristic feature is a breach of law. 
When we discuss about the legal responsibility of the minister as a special 
legal responsibility form from certain view, we may start out of the fact 
that the situation of the minister in the state structure is different from the 
general responsibility forms of law, it required to construct a special res­
ponsibility form. This particular responsibility basically appears in the 
special regulation system of the criminal and disciplinary responsibility of 
the minister. Therefore special responsibility rules are arranged concerning 
the right to raise an accusation against him, the forum system of responsi­
bility, procedural order, etc. We have to mention that the legal responsibi­
lity of the minister included his eventual responsibility connected with the 
arrangements of individual official matters too.
We have to emphasize that the political and legal responsibility of 
the minister exists only in connection with his official activities indeed. For 
objectionable deeds as private man he is responsible according to the gene­
ral legal regulations. Partly the ministerial responsibility, partly this latter 
one are generally prescribed by highlevel legal rules, even if the referred 
regulation shows significant differences in each country due to its social 
and political order, furthermore to the different character of the govern­
mental systems. In the development of the ministerial responsibility beside 
the implementation of the special legal responsibility arrangements or 
with it more and more importance is acquired by the responsibility for 
results beside the political responsibility. This is understandable too be­
cause of the more and more powerful political involvement of the ministerial 
leadership activities and in the same time its professionalisation promotes 
this responsibility form. However, we have to underline the fact that it
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would not be appropriate at all to survey the responsibility of the minister 
for the results only from the aspects of political and professional require­
ments, but we have to analyze the system of means too, which is able to 
ensure the realization of the expectations on the level of ministerial mana­
gement. Actually this is the point where the ministerial responsibility is 
directly connected to the ministerial independence or better to say to its 
content, namely that every kind of responsibility, therefore the ministerial 
responsibility is also can be implemented only in case of existence of certain 
material and legal means.
3. Reside the development of the ministerial independence and res­
ponsibility we have to mention shortly the organisational aspects of the 
institution of the minister and the main trends prevailing in this sphere.
When we survey the development of the organisational components of 
the ministerial institution, it can be asserted generally that tliis sphere is 
one of the most dynamically changing element of the ministerial manage­
ment and role sphere. This latter is due to several factors Without the claim 
of completeness we may refer e. g. to the fact that the earlier mentioned 
trend of politization and professionalisation of the public administration 
in the bourgeois states have caused a certain kind of division of the public 
administration. Furthermore, the strengthening of the service character 
of public administrative activities beside the traditional public administ­
rative organs led to the ceration of new types organs and entities which 
provide both public administrative and service functions.
Finally the powerful intervention of the capitalist state into the eco­
nomic life has brought along an inner differentiation of the public admi­
nistrative structure, the state sector grew more powerful, although in the 
last years we can witness the emergence of opposite trends as well.
We can trace well the development of the ministerial organisation in 
the socialist countries too. This new trend appears generally in the public 
administration: namely the collective leadership forms and structures (go­
vernmental committees, different interministerial committees, etc.) grew 
stronger in their role, furthermore in the ministerial management the func­
tions and competence sphere of the collegial organs, especially the minis­
terial councils and other similar entities improved, got extended.
It is well-known that the bourgeois development has created several 
types of the ministerial institution and ministerial organisation.
This latter is mentioned here only shortty, namely a couple of cha­
racteristic solutions are mentioned by us. The substance of one of these 
solutions is that the minister is the member of the cabinet and in the same 
time he is the leader of a given ministry as well. This form is obviously a 
result of the French development. Differently, the English development 
led to a multi-level ministerial system, in which the minister is not the 
member of the government in every case by far, or not even the leader of 
the ministry. Finally we have to refer the very significant and more and 
more powerful role of the so-called autonom authorities and structures in the 
ministerial management, which have caused significant changes in the 
organisational system of the ministerial institution. Consequently in some
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countries (Sweden, Finland) the increased weight and role of the autono­
mous authorities — particularly in the sphere of social affairs and educa­
tion — directly caused the duplication of the system of ministerial mana­
gement, at least in that meaning that the actual ministerial apparatus 
which prepares the ministerial decisions, is strongly separated from the 
professional apparatus, which carry out these decisions -  actually this 
latter are the mentioned autonomus structure and authorities.
Abother important element of the organisational side of the minis­
terial institution is the inner organisation of the ministry and the develop­
ment of the division of inner tasks and competences. In the bourgeois 
countries the 'political and the public administrative ( official) management 
of the ministries are separated more-less from each other, i. e. generally the 
relation with the Parliament appears as an extra element, as a special func­
tion. Consequently the minister as a primarily political factor generally has 
an administrative deputy and another deputy, whose main responsibility 
is to maintain relations with the Parliament. Although in the socialist state 
development — due to the different character of the state machinery — 
inside the ministerial management similar division of labour has not emer­
ged unambigously and consequently, inside the ministerial management 
more and more powerful is the claim and need to introduce a public admi­
nistrative state secretary position (or deputy minister function), and similar 
position to keep a steady relation with the organ of people’s representatives 
We can experience such steps already in some socialist countries in the 
way of constructing for example a function of ministerial general secretary 
or office head, etc.
Another important element of the ministerial inner organisation is the 
implementation of the principle of collcgiality in the management of the 
ministry and the construction of the appropriate organisational forms in 
order to achieve this. Otherwise this trend can be observed in both the 
capitalist and socialist countries — although in different form and depth. Of 
has an effect on the traditional interpretation of the one-man ministerial co­
rse this leadership or even on the conceptual elements of the institution of mi­
nisterial responsiblity too. Finally we mention that the organisational featu­
res of the ministerial institution are strongly influenced by the co-ordination 
mechanisms in the public administration, furthermore by the increase of 
role and weight of consultative organs. This is largely connected to the gro­
wing importance of the inter-brancli problems and the approach to the 
administrative processes with emphasis on the system and the complex 
character of them. This process obviously can be traced in both the capi­
talist and the socialist state organisations, several concrete organisational 
forms were created.
The development trends which were outlined in a simple form and the 
applied solutions — each and all — obviously require the examination 
of the domestic solutions, drawing the appropriate consequences, consi­
dering the characteristics, traditions of the Hungarian state development, 
moreover the requirements of the modernisation of our political system 
generally.
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II. Tlie governmental relation system of the minister
The ministerial activities are extensive and it is realized in the frame­
work of a multiple relation system. This system of relations from one as­
pect can be connected to the political system, its components, other aspects 
prevail within the state organisation. Naturally the ministerial activities 
have such elements which involve the whole society or some parts of it. 
The components, relations of the ministerial relation system contains a 
special feature, moreover depending on the given sphere the methods and 
means are also different — through them this system of relations takes 
shape. In this place we cannot survey the whole ministerial system of rela­
tions. As it follows we seek the answer: how the government relation system 
of the minister is developing, what are the characteristic features of this 
system of relations, what is the recent situation like, what kind of possible 
trends of its improvement exist. In order to show the conceptual elements 
of the governmental relation system of the minister, we have to deal shortly 
with the interpretation of the governmental activity itself.
When we discuss about the terminological elements of the governmen­
tal activity, this activity can be surveyed from both the object and the sub­
ject side. The object approach is looking for the answer to the question, 
what kind of activity can be interpreted as governmental activity, in other 
words, what are the most important criteria of the governmental activity. 
The subject approach is different: it surveys the governmental activity by 
the definition of the categories of those organs which conduct governmental 
activities, i. e. it intends to give answer to the question: which organs do 
government activities. Naturally both approaches have their own merits, 
however the examination of the characteristic features of the governmental 
activity requires the simultaneous application of the above-mentioned app­
roaches. As it is known, during the history the governmental activity have 
changed and developed in the framework of the state activity, as one of its 
parts. The bourgeois authors usually regard the governmental acticity as a 
certain, generally most important field, phere of the state activity. Accor- 
dingly the governmental activity is connected to the operation of either 
the head of state or the legislation (Parliament) or the executive power (go­
vernment) or all of these combined. Parallel with the appearance of the po­
litical parties and their growing role in the life of the sociaty ans state 
such ideas also appeared which interpret the governmental activity as an 
activity which goes beyond the state activity, respectively they refer to 
such elements, which ooeur outside the framework of the state activity. 
Indeed, if we interprete the governmental activity in a wider meaning it can 
be hardly doubted that it has an aspect which goes beyond the state activity. 
Por example, it is obvious that in the socialist countries the leadership 
role of the Party is one or even decisive element of the governmental acti­
vity. In that regard the governmental activity can be considered as the most 
significant and most extensive activity sphere of the management of the society, 
which possess both elements of political mechanism and state organisation.
Beside this widely interpreted sphere of notions of the governmental
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activity there is another, narrower sphere of notions too, namely the govern- 
mental activity conducted by the state organs as a special form of stale activity. 
The governmental activity in this sense is that sphere of state guidance 
activity, which determines the most important tasks and aims of the state, 
the means, methods and pace of the realization of these tasks and aims! 
ensures the necessary material and personal conditions, supervises and 
controls the implementation of the planned tasks and aims. The above- 
mentioned criteria of the governmental activity of the state also indicate 
that this kind of state activity is to be considered as the supreme level 
state activity. Consequently the practice of the governmeantal activity be­
longs to the tasks of the supreme state organs. This latter aspect, however, 
leads us to the survey of the subject side of the governmental activity.
I t comes from the character of the governmental activity of the state 
that in the practice the decisive role belongs to the supreme stale power and 
representative organ (Parliament) , the head of the state, or the entity practicing 
the functions of the head of state (Presidium, State Council, etc.), furthermore 
the government as the top executive-authoritative organ. Without doubt 
these are the organs which carry the governmental activities. Actually the 
relation among them can give answer to the question concerning the go­
vernmental form of the state too.
However, a question comes out whether the mentioned top state 
organs can be considered as the exclusive possessors of the governmental 
activity ? The answer given to this question presumes an examination of 
the state structure and characteristics of the given state. If we examine this 
question among the conditions of socialism, then above all the qualification 
of the activity of the governmental committees deserves attention.
We known that the Council of Ministers may create government com­
mittees for the provision of certain tasks. The governmental committees 
operate in a competence sphere transferred by the Council of Ministers. 
In the activity of these committees that element can be distinguished which 
aims the co-ordination and guidance of the ministeries and main authorities. 
In the same time in the ectivity of the governmental committees -  altho­
ugh with different weight and ratio — there are some governmental ele­
ments, which go beyond the narrower management of the ministries and 
authorities with national competence. However, this latter element is 
connected to the transferred character of their competence too. Conse­
quently in the framework of theit competence the governmental commit­
tees can be listed among those organs which provide certain governmental 
activities.
The subject side of the governmental activity is connected with a 
further problem, namely to the interpretation of activity of the ministries 
from the view of the governmental activity. Considering this question 
there is no uniform opinion in the literature, either. Followingly in a wide 
sphere there is such a view wich does not consider the activity of the mi­
nistries as a governmental activity. However, there is another opposite 
view too, which startsout of the fact that the head of the ministry is a 
member of the government, therefore largely the activity of the ministry
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is to be considered as a governmental activity. Between these two extreme 
view there are several views in between. Their point is that only a certain, 
qualified field of the ministries’ activities can be accepted as a governmen­
tal activity. This way the ministry would be such an organ, which provides 
actually “dual” kinds of activities, namely governmental and non-govern­
mental activities. According to our view in connection to the listing of 
ministries to the governmental or non-governmental organs we ought to 
survey several circumstances. The main initial point seems to be the fact 
that the ministries subordinated to the government fulfill their tasks in the 
framework of a certain branch or function. This way the limited character 
of the competence of the ministry and the characteristic feature of its 
activity lead us to the consequence that the ministries cannot be qualified 
as governmental organs in the real meaning of the word. This latter na­
turally does mot mean that the ministries’ activity is not connected very 
significantly with the governmental activity litself. This point can be ob­
served particularly in the process of preparation of the governmental deci­
sions, as the ministries have a very important role in the system of pre­
paration of decisions.
Another problem is the estimation of the activity of the minister. In a 
given case we have to consider which kind of activity of the minister is 
examined. As a member of the government the minister undoubtedly take 
part in the governmental activity, although it is also obvious, that the 
the governmental activity as such ultimately is practiced by the govern­
ment as an entity, not by its individual members. In the same time the 
minister’s activity towards the given administrative branch, his manage­
ment activities and the aspect of his operation to lead the work of the mi­
nistry as an organisation, cannot be taken as governmental activities. 
Naturally the above-mentioned facts do not include such case when the 
government explicitly authorizes one of its members to provide certain 
governmental activity (e. g. the institution of government commissioner+. 
In such case the provison of the governmental activity actually takes place 
in a transferred competence sphere, i. e. its base is the fact of the delega­
tion instead of the character and sphere of those rights and licences which 
belong to the minister anyway.
Followingly such consequence can be drawn that the governmental 
organs are the supreme state power and representative organ (i. e. the Par­
liament) the Presidential Council and the Council of Mmisters and the appo­
inted governmental committee. Followingly the governmental relation sys­
tem of the minister should be examined from these three main aspects.
1. The relation of the minister to the Parliement, his responsibility 
to the Parliament is probably the oldest and most important feature of the 
ministerial sphere of competence and independence. This latter is relevant 
for the Hungarian development indeed.
I t  is known that in Hungary the legal status and the institution of 
ministerial responsibility is regulated initially by the Act III of 1848 with a 
comprehensive character, it was actually constructed by this Act. 1 his regu­
lation system in the whole possess the general characteristics of the hour-
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geois regulative solutions, although some of its features represent peculiar 
solutions. Without going into details of the regulations -  which are ela­
borated by the domestic law literature, here we refer only to the fact that 
the law regulation in 1848 had emphasized the political and constitutional 
responsibility of the minister, when it had declared the responsibiluty of the 
minister for every such behaviour or regulation, which violates the inde­
pendence of the countra, the constitutional guarantees, the laws, the perso­
nal fieedom and the sanctity of the property. The Act had referred to the 
political responsibility of the minister to the Parliament too when it had 
declared that the minister upon the request of the Parliament is obliged 
to be present and give answers, furthermore to make available official do­
cuments for the Parliament. Although the regulation directly did not pre­
scribed it, but such practice was introduced and accepted that the Parlia­
ment may ask questions to the minister, who is obliged to give immediate 
answer or may answer it in the next session.
Although during the latter development phase the regulatioas con­
cerning the relation of the minister to the Parliament and his responsibility 
to the legislative organ undoubtedly went through important changes -  
both in the times of dualism and between the two world wars, however, 
we can state that in the whole development period, even with some correc­
tions till, the acceptance of the Constitution in 1949 besically the mentioned 
legal regulations of 1848 were valid. The relation of the minister to the Per- 
liament, his connection with this organ and his responsibility are deter­
mined by the text of the Act XX of 1949 and its modification, the Act I 
of 1972 and its executive orders, especially the Act 111 of 1973 concerning 
the responsibility of the minister and state secretary, furthermore the order 
of the Parliament.
The question emerges what are the components today of the relation 
between minister and Parliament, which aspects of it require updating and 
further improvement ?
The relation of the minister to the Parliament as the organ of state 
power and people’s representation is determined largely by the general 
relation between the legislative and executive power. Without the claim 
of completeness among the socialist conditions the basic aspects of this 
relation can lie summarized as follows: the organs of public administration 
operate suboidinated to the supreme state power and representative organs, 
according to their guidance: the government and its members are elected 
by the supreme organs of state power and they are relieved by these organs; 
the top organs require reports from the Council of Ministers and the mem­
bers about their activities. Those law regulations which are created by the 
public administration, can be terminated, changed; the top representative 
organs guide theii work, control the operation of the government and its 
members. Therefore there is a certain relation of dependence, between the 
top state power and representative organs and the Council of Ministers 
and its members, which includes both the organisational and the operatonali 
spheres. Naturally in the course of this development this dependence rela­
tion and connection do not always prevail, there is no constant harmony
_________________________THE INSTITUTION AKD GOVERNMENTAL 15
}>etween its declared and actual content, in this aspect there are things to 
do even these days. However, this fact does not change the principle that 
the organs of executive power should operate subordinate to the legislative 
power, which gives guidance to the former.
As we know, concerning the relation between the minister and the 
Parliament the Constitution rules on one hand that the members of the 
Council of Ministers are responsible to the Parliament and they are obliged 
to give a report on their activities, on the other hand it provides that the 
representative may ask any question from the member of the Council of 
Ministers in his sphere of competence, and the member of the government 
is obliget to answer in the session of the Parliament. Moreover, according 
to the Constitution the members of the Council oi Ministers are selected 
by the Parliament and relieve them according to the proposal of the Presi­
dential Council.
The mentioned constitutional provisions are further elaborated by the 
law about the legal status of ministers and state secretaries and their res­
ponsibilities and the order of the Parliament. Then the Act III of 1973 
refers to the fact that the mandate of the members of the Ministerial Coun­
cil is terminated by resignation, relieve or other way, respectively concer­
ning the election, relieve or resgination of the Council of Ministers the com- 
ponence sphere of the Presidential Council to substitute the 1 arliement 
takes place. Further more the lew also tries to from the responsibility of the 
members of the Council of Ministers more concretely saying that the mem­
bers of the government are responsible for the implementation of act and 
the other legal regulations, for the corporative operation of the Council of 
Dinisters, for the management of public administrative branches which 
belong to their competence sphere and for the guidance of the subordinated 
organs.
The statutes of the Parliament establishes further detailed rules con­
cerning the relations of the minister with the Parliament and its commit­
tees. Consequently it regulates the participation and speaking rights of the 
minister at the session of the Parliament, his obligation to answer to the 
interpellations and questions, his duty to report and the problems of the 
connection between the minister and the committees of the Parliament. 
Concerning the latter the statutes declears that in the session of the com­
mittee the members of government take part with the rights of contiibu- 
tion, furthermore the committee may turn with its proposals to the com­
petent minister and the report of the minister to the Parliament should be 
made available for the component committee or committees. The statutes 
establish the answer obligations of the minister too, when it declares that 
the Parliament and the committee sessions — nameyl the proposals, criti­
cism and questions in these sessions — are entitled toget answer from the 
minister at the session of after the session.
As the above-mentioned facts sign, a dual direction of the relation 
of the minister to the Parliament can be distinguished: on one hand, the 
activity of the minister is connected to the Parliament in the form of his 
governmental membership', finally this relation appears in the responsibility
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of the government as an entity to the Parliament; on the other hand, the 
ministerial activity can be related directly to the Parliament, realized in 
the responsibility of the minister to the Parliament and his dependence 
on the Parliament. If  we approach the question from this aspect — which 
otherwise depends on the nature of the observed sphere of questions — 
considering the experiences of the domestic regulations and practice it is 
reasonable to direct the attention as follows:
a) the first question is the election of the minister and his dismissal 
by the Parliament. In this aspect there is a certain contradicton appears 
between the regulation and the practice. This is represented by the fact 
that the Parliament actually deals w ith the election and relieve of the mi­
nisters at its statutory session, the so-called continuous election and dis­
missal is done by the Presidential Council. According to our view this cont­
radiction between the regulation and the actual practice should be solved 
urgently. This measure is justified not only by legal regulation aspects, 
but on one hand the further increases of the leading and supervising role 
of the Parliament towards the ministers, on the other hand it should be 
secured that the constitutionally established competence sphere of the Parli­
ament prevails completely and without doubt. Of course this latter mea­
sure requires a comprehensive overhaul of the general substitution compe­
tence sphere of the Presidential Council regarding the Parlia ment too.
b) An important element of the connection of the minister to the Par­
liament and his responsibility to the Parliament is the institution of inter­
pellation. As we mentioned, the institution of interpellation is regulated in 
details by the statutes of the Parliament through the latest modification, 
namely it separates the interpellation and the interrogation, i. e. the simple 
questioning of the minister in some concrete issue. Although in both cases 
there is a way of raising questions there are significant differencesbetween 
the interpellation and the simple questioning. The substance of this diffe­
rence is that in the case of interpellation the Parliament should decide 
actually whether it accepts the minister’s answer or not, the simple inter­
rogation merely serves as an information and consequently on the merit of 
the ministerial answer the supreme state power and representative organ 
does not take any stand
According to our opinion the recent weak point of our interpellation 
regulation and practice is related to the acceptance or rejection of the mi­
nisterial answer. Namely the statutes recently rule only the case when 
the Parliament does not accept the answer given to an interpellation, fol- 
lowingly the interpellation should be made available to a competent parli­
amentary or other committee which surveys it. However it does not come 
out clearly from the regulation whether the survey of the committee is 
limited to the question whether the answer to the interpellation is reason­
able or needs some addition or it can be established that the answer is not 
satisfactory therefore in case of the rejected answer by the Parliament 
what kind of measure should be taken against the minister including the 
possibility of his dismissal from his office. We presume that both in the 
regulation and in the practice today it is an need for an unambiguous rule,
2  ANNALES—Sectio Iuridica—Tomus XXIX.
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namely that in the case of negative vote of the Parliament on a answer given 
to the interpellation the calling for responsibility should be considered 
some way too and in case it is justified, the proposal for his responsibility 
should be forwarded and submitted to the Parliament. Related to this 
problem we ought to examine the possibility of introduction of the non- 
confidence vote proposal against the minister too, with the remark that the 
non-confidence proposal should be applied only against the person of that 
certain minister and this way it would not mean necessarily the expression 
of non-confidence against the whole government. The optional introduc­
tion of the nonconfidence vote proposal naturally would require the detailed 
regulation of the submitting, discussing of the proposal, the legal conse­
quences and the exercise of responsibility too.
c) Another important element of the relation of the minister to the 
Parliament is the ministerial report for the Parliament. The duty to report 
is an obligation for both the government and the ministers who lead certain 
branches of the public administration.
Among those reports which were submitted by the government it is 
especially important that particular report which gives account on the 
implementation of the earlier governmental programme debated by the 
Parliament. The evaluation of this report by the Parliament includes the 
activities of the ministers as members of the government. Compared to 
this general feature it is more individualized and concrete the discussion 
of each minister by the Parliament. These reports primarily give a chance 
to evaluate the operations and activities of the minister leading the given 
administrative branch, although — in an indirect way — they give a 
glimpse on the activities of the government from a certain aspect as well.
As the ministerial report includes the evaluation of the management 
tasks of that given minister too, it would be reasonable to regulate by law 
the questions concerning the eventual negative parliamentary opinion on 
the report too, including the development of the various forms of responsi­
bilities. Namely, the evaluation of the ministerial report should include 
not only whether the operation of the minister harmonizes the requirements 
set up by law, but even more that point: how efficient is the operation 
of the minister, whether it is satisfactory according to the expectations, 
how effective is it from social and professional aspects. The consequent 
prevalence of these latter aspects, however, undoubtedly presumes the 
judgement on the efficiency of ministerial activities, i. e. it means a certain 
result responsibility too towards the Parliament too. This latter point 
support that earlier expectation that the regulation solutions concerning 
the responsibility for results i. e. as political responsibility should be intro­
duced, even the application occasionally of the proposal of non-confidence 
vote too.
2. The basic regulations concerning the relation of the ministers to­
wards the Presidential Council on the basis of constitutional rules on the 
legal status of the ministers and state secretaries and their responsibilities 
are determined by the act 111 of 1973. From the point of the general sub­
stitutive sphere of the Presidential Council the mentioned law ascertains
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that if the Parliament does not have sessions, the Presidental Council 
elects, recalls and disposes the ministers. Furthermore according to this 
Act the ministers are responsible for their work to the Presidential Council 
as well. Finally the Act refers to the fact that the reporter of the proposal 
submitted to the Presidential Council is appointed by the Council of Mi­
nisters, in the majority of the cases the competent minister is the reporter 
of the case.
As we have already mentioned, concerning the relations of the minis­
ters to the Presidential Council the general substitutive competence of the 
Presidential Council has primary importance. Finally this general subs­
titutive competence is the reason why — according to our view — the res­
ponsibility and dependence of the minister towards the Parliament does 
not accomplished to the desired extent. I t is especially true concerning 
the election and recall of the ministers. Moreover in the practice it is not 
quite clear, what are the mode and form of the ministerial responsibility 
to the Presidential Council, because the Presidential Council does not the 
ministers to give account on their responsibilities. We ought to mention 
that the minister who gives report on some agenda in front of the Presiden­
tial Council, essentially represents the government, as the government 
previously discusses the draft copy of the law decree to be released by the 
Presidential Council and the discussed and approved draft copy is submit­
ted by the competent minister — together with the minister of justice — 
to the Presidential Council.
As it comes out from both the regulation and the practice, the rela­
tion between the minister and the Presidential Council requires updating 
on several accounts, because the actual prevalence of the ministerial res­
ponsibility actually is not even to be discussed — with the exception of 
election and recall. In that aspect the solution would be reasonable that 
the revision of the general substitutive role of the Presidential Council 
would result that the Presidential Council would create an independent 
sphere of competence for itself and concerning this role the minister’s rela­
tion and its elements would be worked out towards the collective body of 
state leadership.
3. A further important factor and component of the governmental re­
lation system of the minister is the relation ofminister to the Council of 
Ministers. The relation with the Council of Ministers is regulated by the 
already mentioned Act III of 1973 and the agenda schedule of the Council 
of the Ministers.
Among the constitutional regulations that rule is particularly im­
portant according to which the Council of Ministers guides and harmonizes 
the activities of the ministries. Furthermore, according to the constitution 
the ministers lead the branch of state administration of their competence 
according to the law and the statutes of the Council of Ministers and give 
guidance to the organs subordinated to them. Concerning the former there 
is a constitutional regulation according to which the ministers are obliged 
to report their activities to the Council of Ministers too and therefore they 
are responsible to the Council of Ministers too.
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The Act II I  of 1973 gives further concrete details about the mentioned 
constitutional regulations. Consequently the Act prescribes that the minis­
ters participate in a certain way at the corpoi’ative activities of the govern­
ment, manage the branches of public administration in the way regulated 
by the Council of Ministers, may submit proposals to the Council of Mi­
nisters and take part in the decision-making process. Related to this latter 
aspect the Act particularly regulates that the members of the Council of 
Ministers are entitled to equal rights in making the corporative kind of 
decisions. Moreover we call for attention concerning the relation of the 
ministers to the governmental commissions. Their operational rules empha­
size that the ministers may take proposals againsthe decisions of the gove­
rnmental commissions at the joint sessions of the Council of Ministers.
Beyond the mentioned regulations we have to refer to the rules con­
cerning the agenda of the Council of Ministers, which ascertains detailed 
prescriptions on the requirements of the proposals to be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers, on the harmonisation procedure, the report obligation 
of the ministers and other questions related to the mechanism of the go­
vernmental work. It is reasonable to call for attention to the fact that the 
leaders of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Mi­
nisters) provide supervision tasks on the activities of the ministers, although 
the content elements and procedural order of this control activity have not 
been regulated yet. After the overview of the valid regulation that question 
appears, which are those most important features, which appear in the 
relation system between the minister and the Council of Ministers ? In 
order to give answer to this question we have to consider multiple connec­
tions. One of the aspects is namely that partly the minister as the member 
of that entity has responsibility for the activity of the government, on the 
other hand he owes responsibility to the Council of Ministers as the leader 
of the given branch for the accompishment of those tasks, cases which be­
long to this competence sphere, for the fulfilment of obligations and res­
ponsibilities, i. e. for the management of the given branch of public admi­
nistration. This two-way responsibility form is closely connected to that 
responsibility which is realized in the preparation of decisions and their 
implementation. The problem of preparation and implementation of deci­
sions appears not only towards the entity of the Council of Ministers but 
towards the governmental commissions as well. Finally — as we mentioned 
we have to examine the questions of relation between the leaders of the 
government (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers) and the ministers, 
particularly stressing the content elements and order of the supervision 
function.
a) Cnncerning the relation of the minister to the Council of Ministers 
that constitutional line has a fundamental importance that the Council of 
Ministers guides, manages the activities of the ministries and this way the 
leaders of the ministries, the ministers too. This aspect of the activity of 
the Council of Ministers is that this way the harmonized activity of the 
public administrative organs should be ansured first of all and this way 
the management activity inside the system of public administration relati-
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vely separated from the governmental activities of the Council of Ministers, 
which prevails not only inside the state administration, but in the society 
as a whole as well. If we survey the management activities of the Council of 
Ministers towards the ministries, it can be said generally that this manage­
ment activity contains both theoretical and operative elements. Approaching 
the question from the substantial side, within the activity of the Council 
of Ministers towards the ministers those elements relatively well can bo 
recognized which are generally the main content elements of managerial 
and administrative activities: among them the gathering of information, 
the co-ordination, the decision and control elements could be emphasized 
particularly. Without a detailed examination of the manegement activity 
of the Council of Ministers according to the mentioned aspects we only 
refer to the fact that in the management activity the weight and role of 
theoretical and operative elements usually show various picture, even more, 
it seems, that today the operative element rather dominatesit compared 
to the theoretical kind of management activities. Although considering the 
important characteristics of the different development periods, the emer­
gence of the actual situation it would be difficult to give once and forever 
a given ratio for the theoretical and operative management elements, ho­
wever. according to our opinion today we have to emphasize that by the 
reduction of operative elements the theoretical and conceptional element 
should prevails much more strongly than it does today in the management 
activities of the government towards the ministries, naturally the operative 
management elements should not be eliminated altogether.
The other characteristic feature of the management activities of the 
Council of Ministers towards the ministries that the tasks, functions and 
licences of the managerial activities have not been regulated yet. Conside­
ring the concent elements of the management competence sphere of the 
Council of Ministers which prevail in this relation the appropriate parts of 
the Constitution and some more concrete rules of each branch and activity 
sphere prevail. Following this method of regulation it would be extremely 
hard to list even approximately those concrete licences which belong to the 
Council of Ministers from this view. However, this circumstance makes 
difficult to answer that general kind of question: where is the end of the 
management competence sphere of the Council of Ministers and in this 
relation where should be drawn the limits and frameAvork of the actual 
ministerial independence? Although the rules concerning the responsibi­
lities and competence sphere of the minister give some idea on the extent 
of ministerial independence, however, it seems that today it is urgent to 
draw more precise limits on the management of the Council of Ministers and 
ministerial independence. Among others this would have be important from 
the aspect of the efficiency of the management as Avell as the more unam­
biguous prevalence of responsibilty. The requirement of such general 
regulation also supports and justifies the creation of a new act on the 
Council of Ministers, in Avhich both the most important elements of the 
management activities of the Council of Ministers and the main rules of 
the ministerial sphere of competence and independence could be prescibed.
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We note that the application of such a solution would require the compre­
hensive overhaul of the multi-grade law regulation material concerning the 
ministerial sphere of competence too. As it is known the regulations con­
cerning the tasks and competence sphere of the minister can be found mainly 
in the constitutional rules and the so-called branch legislation, e. g. the 
construction act, the education act and the 46/1978 MT decree or the Co­
uncil of Ministers on the economic branch management and the resolution 
by the Council of Ministers which was adapted in March 1985 and prescribes 
the tasks and responsibilities of the ministers. This multi-grade regulation 
scheme, which contains the possibilities of collision or even contradictions, 
should be updated urgently. This/task would be accomplished by the adap­
tation of a special law regulation or by the mentioned act on the Council 
of Ministers.
b) In the relation system between the minister and the Council of 
Ministers a further important problem is the connection between the mi­
nisters and the governmental commissions. According to our opinion in the 
past probably the most problem have appeared in this sphere of manage­
ment concerning both the ministerial independence and the operation of 
the Council of Ministers as an entity. Therefore it is reasonable to go into 
details in this question. It is reasonable despite the fact that the revision 
of the system ofj economic governmental commissions and the new regula- 
tionog their tasks and competence spheres in January 1985 obviously meant 
a remarkable progress forwards compared to the previous situation.
As it is known the legal ground for establishing governmental com­
missions is determined by the constitution. Due to the 1972 amendment 
of our constitution it authorizes the Council of Ministers to create govern­
mental commissions to fulfill certain tasks. (§. 40/1). We have to mention 
that — though earlier the constitution have not regulated the establish­
ment of governmental commissions — the Council of Ministers have ope­
rated governmental commissions before the constitutional amendment of 
1972 too.
Before 1956 the plenary session of the Council of Ministers had an 
institutionalized presidium, which resulted a certain distribution of workload 
between the plenary session of the Council of Ministers and its presidium. 
Considering that the presidium dealt with several cases of operative na­
ture, the need was necessarily smaller for the operation of governmental 
commissions. Thus in this period actually only two, actual governmental 
commission in the contemporary sense have operated beside the Council 
of Ministers, namely the Defense Committee and the Commission of Economic 
Relations. The operational field of the former was actually similar to the 
recent Defense Committee, the latter accompished tasks connected to the 
international economic co-operation. After 1956 in the corporative opera­
tion of the Council of Ministers such a need took shape that the preparation 
arrangements of the economic proposals should be more professional and 
better founded. For the aim of ensuring this at the end of 1956 the Economic 
Commission of the Council of Ministers has been created, its main task 
has been the preliminary discussion of the economic proposals to be sub-
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mitted to the plenary session of the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile the 
Commission of Economic Relations has ceased to exist and its sphere of 
activity was taken over by the Economic Commission. After a relatively 
short time in 1959 for the management and co-ordination of international 
economic relations the Council of Ministers has established the Commission 
of International Economic Relations. Till 1969, when the Scientif ic Political 
Commission has been created beside the Council of Ministers the mentioned 
governmental commissions operated.
In this stage of development the main characteristics of the regula­
tion of the activities and operation of governmental commission can be 
summarized as follows: in the operation of governmental commissions 
the préparative, evauative and co-ordinative activity prevailed, the founding 
regulat ions have not authorized the commission# with direct rights to formulate 
decisions. Their competence in decisions have gradually developed. The 
independent sphere of decisions took shape at first in 1969 in the founding 
documents of the Commission of Scientific Policy. Accordingly the co mmissi- 
on may decide in its sphere of competence obligatory way for the minis­
ters and the heads of organs with national competence. The independent 
decision sphere of the governmental commissions took shape in the later 
and contemporary law regulations concerning the tasks and competence 
spheres of govern mental commissions.
Recently the tasks and competence spheres of governmental commissi­
on are settled by the following laws:
The Council of Ministers has created the State Plan Commission by 
its resolution 1023/1973. (VI. 30.) Mt. h. The tasks and responsibilities of 
this commission are prescribed by the resolution 1007/1987. (I. 15.) Mt. h.
In 1980 the Commission of International Economic Relations has 
been terminated and the Economic Commission, has been established. In 
1987 the Economic Commission has ceased to exist and once again the 
Commission of International Economic Relations was set up and the Eco­
nomic Supervision Commission of the Council of Ministers was created. The 
tasks and competence of the former has been settled by the resolution 
1009/1978. (I. 15.) Mt., the latter by the 1008/1987. (I. 15.) Mt.
According to the regulations of the Act II of 1976 on national defense 
the Council of Ministers fulfills its duties concerning the defense matters 
by the Defense Commissions in a previously settled sphere.
Tn 1978 the Council of Ministers has regulated once again the tasks 
and competence sphere of the Commission of Scientific Policy created in 
1969 by its resolution 1016/1978. (VI. 10.) Mt. h. This law has been amended 
at last in December 1985.
The main features of the legal status of governmental commissions 
can be summarized as follows:
The governmental commissions are established by the Council of Mi­
nisters, they are responsible for their activities and decisions to the Council 
of Ministers. They possess decision competence in the sphere transferred 
to them by the Council of Ministers.
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Actually the content of their competence has three main directions:
— the 'preliminary discussion and evaluation of the proposal to be 
submitted to the Council of Ministers;
— decision-making (decisions and standpoints in the transferred sphere 
of competence);
— surveillance and control of the implementation of the decisions 
taken by the Council of Ministers in those areas which are connected to 
their sphere and tasks.
A problem which is connected to the decision competence of the go­
vernmental commissions is the place of the governmental commission deci­
sions in the legal system (resolutions). The first question is whether they 
should be considered as legal sources or not ?
Examining this problem we have to start from the fact that the reso­
lutions of the governmental commissions are not qualified as legal sources 
by the constitution and the laws concerning the proclamation of legal sour­
ces. [Law Decree 1974.24 and the resolution 1063/1974. (XII. 30.) Mt. h.] 
therefore they do not contain any rule on their proclamation. Followingly 
the resolutions of the governmental commission — according to our opi­
nion — are not legal sources, but they should be taken as means of govern­
mental management activities.
There is a further problem, namely for whom and for which field the 
resolutions of governmental commissions are obligatory and how they 
should be proclaimed? Concerning the sphere of obligations the recent legal 
rules do not contain unambiguous rules on that matter. Therefore according 
to the law regulation which determines the tasks and competence spheres 
of these governmental commissions with economic profile the commissions 
may take decisions in a transferred competence sphere and these decisions 
do not involve the competence and responsibility of the ministers (heads 
of organs with national competence). The law regulation related to the 
tasks and responsibilities of the Commission of Scientific Policy rules about 
obligations concerning ministers and national organs. Beyond this, not 
quite unambiguous regulation it is not quite clear who should be considered 
“authorities” and especially “other” organs ? The clear formulation of 
these problems is essential, because the uncertainty of the possible add­
resses can adversely influence the implementation of the decisions con­
cerned .
Connected to the latter there is the problem of proclamation of the 
resolution of governmental commissions. Putting aside some rare excep­
tions the resolutions of governmental commissions do not appear in the 
official bulletins, but the interested parties receive them directly. According 
to our opinion a problematic aspect of the relation between the minister 
and the governmental commissions is the certain organisational and com­
petence exaggeration of the governmental commissions. The latter is espe­
cially can be observed if we approach the problem from the aspect of eco­
nomic governmental commissions, whereas we have mentioned — recently 
three governmental commission operate in the economic governmental ma­
nagement. This fact by itself makes difficult the guidance of the operations
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of the governmental commissions and their harmonisation, it could lead 
to the emergence of parallel measures, it can yield collision fields and cont­
radictions as well.
As far as the oversized competence is concerned the latter may become 
an initiator of several problems indeed. E. g. it may strengthen the cent­
ralisation efforts in the decision-making process, it may lead to a multi- 
grade or even parallel decision centres. The relatively wide decision sphere 
of the governmental commissions can adversely influence the institution 
of ministerial independence and responsibility, as even in such questions 
they require governmental commission decisions, where the leader of the 
managing organ can decide independently in the framework of his compe­
tence and responsibility or the decision could be done in the framework of 
the direct relations among the managing organs.
A further problem that the control function to be fulfilled in the com­
petence of deputy prime minister is not separated properly from the govern­
mental commission presidential function, namely it may cause collisions in 
the management work. Today actually the deputy prime ministers ful­
fill the presidential functions of the governmental commissions. Aiming 
the increase of the efficiency of the management work and the requirement 
of ministerial independence and responsibility, according to our view parti­
cularly the following ideas deserve attention:
The recently existing oversized organisation and competence should be 
re-examined and eliminated.
In the course of this process the following outlines would be reasonable 
to introduce:
— corporative responsibility of the Council of Ministers should be en­
sured concerning all items in its competence;
— the ministerial responsibility and independence should prevail con­
sequently, the responsible decision of the leaders should be a co-ordinated 
effort in such inter-branch problems, which do not require governmental 
decision;
— the further decentralisation process of decision competence should 
be strengthened, that principle should prevail that the resolutions and 
measures should be taken there where the informations are available the 
most, the conditions of implementation can be assessed at best and the 
responsibility can be called unambiguously;
— the existing parallel operations, the multi-grade and occasionally 
repeated decisons should be eliminated;
— the general principle should be that in the operation of govern­
mental commissions the preparative, evaluative, co-ordinative and control 
activities should have basic and determinative role;
— it should be clearly stated that the decisions of governmental com­
missions are not legal sources;
— the competence spheres and responsibilities of the presidents of the 
commissions should be drawn more clearly; consequently the function 
of the deputy prime minister as supervisor should be separated from the 
functions of the president of the governmental commission;
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— aiming the long-term development aims as an alternativ proposal it 
would be reasonable to examine the possibilities of creating and operating 
a smaller cabinet (presidium) inside the Council of Ministers.
c) In the survey of the connection between the Council of Ministers 
and the minister there is a separate question, namely the development 
of the relation between the minister and the senior officials of the Council 
of Ministers (prime minister, deputy prime ministers). As it is known, neit­
her the Constitution, nor the other legislative pieces determine any mecha­
nical relation of sub- and supra-ordination between the senior officials of 
the Council of Ministers and the ministers. Recently the constitutional situ­
ation is that the members of government possess equal rights and duties, 
i. e. actually the prime minister is “primus inter pares”, first among equals. 
This can be stated even considering that according to the Constitution the 
prime minister “leads the sessions of the Council of Ministers and takes 
care of the implementation of the decrees and resolutions of the Council 
of Ministers. “This way he necessarily fulfills certain activities of orienta­
tion, co-ordination. Concerning the legal status of the deputy prime mi­
nister the Constitution does not prescribe any difference between their legal 
status and the ministers.
However in the practice a certain kind of control function has deve­
loped to the ministers on behalf of the senior officials of the Council of 
Ministers, its main contents and organisational order are determined by 
the statutes of the Council of Ministers. Surveying the content elements of 
the control function it can be established that it is connected to the sub­
mission of the work agenda of the Council of Ministers and the proposals 
and even to the release of ministerial level legal regulations as well.
Considering the emphasis on the ministerial independence and respon­
sibility the question emerges: what kind of modernisation meeds can be 
formulated in this aspect ?
First of all, in an adequate level legislative rule the legal status of the 
senior officials of the Council of Ministers (prime minister and deputy prime 
ministers) should be regulated, concerning the supervision functions to be 
fulfilled. I t should be stressed as the main principle that this supervision 
does not mean certain trusteeship, detailed intervention into the minis­
terial activities, but basically such co-ordinativc and harmonizing activity 
is needed, which is based on the observance of the aspects of the full go­
vernment. Furthermore a stand should be taken in the question too how 
far this supervision should have an organisational direction (as it is today), 
or a supervision based on the principle of activity, or eventually certain 
combination of both. By all means it seems that the recent supervision 
of very strongly organisational character is not satisfactory in every aspect.
d) An important element of the governmental system of relations of 
the ministerial activities is the participation of the minister in the ■prepa­
ration and implementation of governmental resolutions. The minister and 
the ministry led by him take part in the preparation of governmental reso­
lutions in several ways and with several methods, it  is especially reasonable 
to mention the professional preparation of the draft copy of proposals, the
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right of proposal initiating some decision and give opinion on some propo­
sal. Naturally the participation in the preparation of decisions includes the 
features too that the minister stresses or represents the special arguments 
and interests of the public administrative branch led by him in the course 
of taking governmental decisions. As it is known the obligation of the mi­
nister to participate in the preparation of resolutions and their representa­
tion is determined by the work plan of the Council of Ministers and the 
work plan of the governmental commissions. Moreover the minister is 
entitled to initiate preparation of proposals aiming resolution beyond the 
prescription of the work plan too. Furthermore the minister participates 
in the preparation activities of the resolutions with the right of evaluation, 
primarily in the framework of the so-called system of harmonization as the 
proposal to be worked out is related to his tasks. We have to mention that 
the comprehensive regulation of this harmonization mechanism (except 
the statutes of the Council of Ministers) has not taken place yet. According 
to our view the recent regulation of harmonization has a too general cha­
racter, it gives too much possibility for the discretionary or even subjectiv 
determination of those persons involved in the harmonization procedure. 
Consequently it would be reasonable to summarize the most basic proposals 
of the procedure of preparation of proposals in a law regulation.
A further problematic feature of the ministry-level preparation of 
resolutions is that it is ruled by an official apparatus which operates in 
the system of hierarchic relations to an extent which is more than desired 
and such way the partipation of the entities in the preparation of decisions, 
resolutions prevails only a limited way. A certain overweight of the official 
apparatus is related to the fact too that today less than justified possibility 
is available to get through the professional and scientific views to an approp­
riate extent which is free from the official hierarchy aspects. Followingly 
is should be ensured that the entities and the representatives of science are 
given a more substantial role in the wide-scale and comprehensive prepa­
ration of decisions. The alternatives and institutional forms of such parti­
cipation should be worked out.
The ministers and their ministries play significant role in the imple­
mentation of governmental decisions. Actually the role of ministries in the 
implementation of resolutions has a dual character: on one hand, they 
directly organize the implementation, on the other hand they inform the 
government and its committees on the situation of the implementation of 
their resolutions.
The successful implementation of decisions depend on several factors. 
In this field the evaluation and guarantee of the proper conditions of imp­
lementation have a decisive importance. I t seems that this is one of the 
most sensitive points in the implementation of the governmental decisions 
too. The experiences refer to the fact that the lack of implementation or 
the improper implementation in several cases is related to the inadequate 
conditions and their complete omission. In a given case both material and 
organisational and personal conditions are included among the conditions 
of implementation, although in actual cases the role and importance of
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the mentioned conditions can be different indeed. It appears as a task in 
the organisation of implementation to separate properly the sphere of 
competence and tasks of the government, the governmental commissions, 
the senior official of the government and the ministers, the elimination of 
the possible parallel procedures. A further aim is to appoint the co-ordina­
tor who is responsible for the implementation in case of complex inter­
branch affairs, to make available the detailed information for the workout 
of the decisions to those persons who implement them, the more effective 
operation of the feedback of the experiences of implementation to the 
decision-taking mechanism and the modernisation of the responsibility 
system.
L IT E R A T U R E
The ministerial and s ta te  secretarial responsibility.
The complex scientific survey of the  developm ent o f public adm inistration. B udapest, 1981. 
Essays on th e  fu rther development of th e  governm ental activities Volume I  — II.
The complex scientific survey of the developm ent o f public adm inistration. Budapest, 1983. 
Lajos Szamel : The operational forms of public adm inistration.
The complex scientific survey of th e  developm ent o f public adm inistration. B udapest, 1984. 
Im re Verébélÿi: The theoretical and practical questions of th e  m inisterial circulars.
The complex scientific survey of the development o f public adm inistration. Budapest, 1981. 
Tibor Madarász: The problems of legislation in the national economy. The final papers of the 
economic law research group network. B udapest, 1985.
Papers from the  field of central public adm inistration.
Államigazgatási Szervezési In tézet (Institu te  of Public Adm inistrative Organisation), 
B udapest, 1986.
The legal bases of th e  economy. Ibid. B udapest, 1985.
P rav o w e  plozheniye m inisterstv v  SSSR. Moscow, 1971.
Benjamin M-Mobis II. Penig L .:  Funktion, Aufgaben und Arbeitsweise der Ministerien. 
Berlin, 1973.
Oanilenko : Politicheskie partii i btirzhuaznoe gossudarstvo. Moscow, 1984.
The central public adm inistrative organs of the Euiopeun popular democracies. Budapest, 
MTA KÉSZ, 1979 -
Sm irtjukov S .:  Sovietskii gossudarstvonnii apparat. Moscow, 1982.
F. Garner: Adm inistrative law. London, 1979.
B. Drago: Science adm inistrative. Paris, 1980.
ИНСТИТУТ МИНИСТРА И ЕГО СВЯЗЬ С ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕННОЙ 
СФЕРОЙ В ВЕНГРИИ
ЛАЙОШ ФИЦЕРЕ
Профессор Университета им. Этвэша Лоранда (Будапешт)
Работа рассматривает общие тенденции развития одного из основных инсти­
тутов государственного механизма и государственного управления, института 
министра, а также на основе регулирования и практики в Венгрии его связь с пра­
вительственными органами.
Статья подробно анализирует факторы, определяющие самостоятельность 
министра, особенно влияние политических партий на эту самостоятельность. Статья 
занимается типами ответственности министра (политическая, юридическая ответст­
венность и ответственность за результативность деятельности), а также органи­
зационными аспектами института министра, обращая особое внимание на роль
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различных консультативных механизмов, действующих в системе руководства 
министерствами.
Во второй части статьи рассматриваются связь министра с Государственным 
Собранием, с Президиумом Республики, а также с правительством и правитель­
ственными комиссиями. На основе критического анализа венгерского регули­
рования и практики работа сформулирует ряд предложений, направленных на 
совершенствование иногда противоречивого положения в данной области, а также 
дальнейшее развитие правового регулирования такой связи.
DIE INSTITUTION DES MINISTERS UND SEINE REGIERUNGSBEZIENUNGEN
IN UNGARN
von
LAJOS FIC ZER E
Professor an  der Eötvös I.ônmd U niversität in Budapest
1 )ie Abhandlung untersucht die allgemeinen Entw icklungstendenzen einer der grundle­
genden Institu tion  des staatlichen Mechanismus und der Verwaltung: der Institu tion  des 
Ministres und seine Beziehungen zu den Regierungsorgane au f G rund der ungarischen Rege­
lung und Praxis.
Ausführlich behandelt der Verfasser die die Selb3ständigkeit des Ministers bestimmenden 
Faktoren, besonders die Einflüsse der politische Parteien au f den Spielraum des Ministers. 
E r analysiert die Typen der Verantw ortlichkeit des Ministers (politische, juristische und 
Ergebnisverantwortlichkeit) und die organisatorischen Bezugnahmen der Institu tion  des 
Ministers, m it besonderer H insicht au f die Rolle der beratenden K örperschaften und kon­
sultativen Mechanismen in der Leitung des Ministeriums.
Der zweite Teil der Abhandlung un tersucht die Beziehung des Ministers zu dem Lan­
destag, Präsidialrat, M inisterrat und zu den Regierungeausschüssen. Der Verfasser formuliert 
zahlreiche Vorschläge, -  au f Grund der kritischen Bewertung der ungarischen Regelung 
und Praxis — für die Lösung der heutigen, gelegentlich widerspruchsvollen Lage, einseliliß- 
lich auch die Fortentw icklung der rechtlichen Regelung.
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